Now we’re into supposed arguments for local atheism and I don’t really expect to be excited by what they come up with, but you never know. We’re getting close to the end of the look at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on atheism and agnosticism. Is this going to go anywhere? Let’s plunge in and see.
“The basic idea behind the low priors argument is that, even if the agnostic is right that, when it comes to God’s existence, the evidence is ambiguous or absent altogether, what follows is not that theism has a middling probability all things considered, but instead that theism is very probably false.” That’s not really much of an argument because, as I keep saying, atheism, at least as I view it, isn’t about proving anything true or false. It’s about rejecting undemonstrative claims until they can backed up with objective evidence. Therefore, saying that theism is likely or even probably false, so what? It is simply not something that should be assented to until they can produce significant evidence that it is true.
“This sort of argument is very relevant to the issue of which of atheism and theism is the appropriate “default” position” No, it’s not. Atheism is the default position. Absolutely nobody pops out of the womb believing in a god. Implicit atheism is the default state, period. That doesn’t seem to impress a lot of people but it remains true, nonetheless.
“If theism has a sufficiently low intrinsic probability, then atheism is arguably the correct default position in the sense that ambiguous or absent evidence will justify, not suspending judgment on the issue of God’s existence, but instead believing that God does not exist.” Which, again, isn’t the position at all. I’m not sure why I have to go on saying this because the entire thing is a straw man. Most people are neither making a positive assertion, nor are they trying to prove atheism “right”. Therefore, let’s jump to the actual argument and see where it falls apart.
“(1) The total evidence does not favor omni-theism over source physicalism.” Let’s not forget that there are many other kinds of theism that have nothing at all to do with omni properties. We’re not really talking about source physicalism, we’re trying to determine if there is any evidence that supports the theistic claims and, sorry to the believers, but there simply isn’t.
“(2) Source physicalism is many times more probable intrinsically than omni-theism.” Objective reality is the only thing that we can actually demonstrate is real. Once you remove base emotionalism from the mix, what else are you left with?
“It follows from (1) and (2) that (3) Source physicalism is many times more probable than omni-theism.” Now hold on. 3 is just a restatement of 2.
“It follows from (3) that (4) Omni-theism is very probably false.” Of course, there are many forms of theism that are not omni-theism. Why does this look like they’re trying to push an agenda?
“It follows from (4) that (5) Atheism (understood here as the denial of omni-theism) is very probably true.” But since that’s a straw man, what difference does it make? I’m not sure what they’re even trying to accomplish here.
“Only the argument’s two premises—steps (1) and (2)—are controversial. The other steps in the argument all clearly follow from previous steps.” Except step 3 is just a restatement of 2, thus if 2 is controversial (which it isn’t), then 3 must be as well. Of course, I disagree with all of this at a base level so it’s not really getting anywhere with me. Besides, I don’t see how either of the first two premises are at all controversial, based on the evidence that we actually have at hand.
“For example, even if omni-theism is supported by the general fact that the universe is complex, one should not ignore the more specific fact, discovered by scientists, that underlying this complexity at the level at which we experience the universe, is a much simpler early universe from which this complexity arose, and also a much simpler contemporary universe at the micro-level, one consisting of a relatively small number of different kinds of particles all of which exist in one of a relatively small number of different states.” Well that was a run-on sentence of epic proportions. It doesn’t get the theist anywhere though because complexity, whether real or interpreted, doesn’t get you to a god. It gets you to complexity, nothing more. You’d have to provide evidence that a god does, in fact, exist (or did at one point in time) and that said demonstrable god was, in fact, responsible for said complexity.
Good luck on that.
“In short, it is important to take into account, not just the general fact that the universe that we directly experience with our senses is extremely complex, but also the more specific fact that two sorts of hidden simplicity within the universe can explain that complexity.” Except it’s not. We interpret it as complex, that doesn’t mean that it is. Our interpretations of reality are not necessarily what reality actually is. You can’t get to complexity without a solid definition of what you’re talking about and the theists don’t have one, nor can you get to an explanation of said claimed complexity without providing demonstrable evidence that your explanation is actually responsible. That’s why none of these religious arguments ever convince anyone but the theologically gullible. They don’t actually mean anything. Claims are not evidence of anything but gullibility.
“Another example concerns consciousness. Its existence really does seem to be more likely given omni-theism than given source physicalism (and thus to raise the ratio of the probability of omni-theism to the probability of source physicalism).” Except it doesn’t. These are still just claims backed up by nothing. It is just an assertion that consciousness is special. It’s an idea driven by ego, not evidence. All they’re doing is saying “I can’t imagine a solution that doesn’t include my imaginary friend!” That doesn’t actually prove anything.
“Similar problems threaten to undermine appeals to fine-tuning—that is, appeals to the fact that a number of apparently independent physical parameters have values that, while not fixed by current physical theory, nevertheless happen to fall within a relatively narrow “life-permitting” range assuming no changes to other parameters.” There is no fine tuning to point to. There is APPARENT fine-tuning, things that the human psyche sees as fine-tuning because they are desperate to reach an emotionally comforting conclusion, but that doesn’t make it so.
This is, once again, a prime example of trying to use the wrong tool for the job. Philosophy isn’t a one-size-fits-all solution. If you’re talking about things that actually exist in reality, as any god-claim must, then the tool is science, not philosophy.
“In fairness to omni-theism, however, most of those humans are moral agents and many have religious experiences apparently of God.” No, they don’t. They CLAIM to have religious experiences with a god. That doesn’t mean it’s actually happening as they describe. I also think that most people are poor excuses for moral agents. They act as they act because they want to believe a certain way, not because they have any good reason to think that it’s true. As I’ve said before, moral realists of any stripe, they’re just lazy. They want the easy way out. Give them rules that are beyond question and they’ll sign on because it’s simpler than having to navigate the complexity of actual morality. Omni-theism doesn’t deserve fairness. They just haven’t earned it.
“The problem is that, while the existence of moral agents is “predicted” by omni-theism better than by source physicalism, it is also true that, given their existence, the variety and frequency of easily avoidable conditions that promote morally bad behavior and that severely limit the freedom, agency, and autonomy of countless human beings are much more likely on source physicalism.” Except that isn’t remotely true. You have to remember that theism of any stripe, it didn’t arise in a vacuum. It simply observed moral agents and then adapted their mythology to match. It didn’t predict anything, that would require that there were no human moral agents when the theology was being formed and that’s simply not true. I don’t believe how simple it is to rip this garbage apart. You’d think they could just open their eyes and see where it’s all wrong.
“It seems, then, that when it comes to evidence favoring omni-theism over source physicalism, the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away.” There is none. There never has been and, at least to date, there isn’t any now. Whether they come up with something in the future is unknown but we can only go with what we have, not what we hope will show up someday.
“Omni-theism, however, is a very specific version of source idealism; it entails that source idealism is true but goes far beyond source idealism by making a number of very specific claims about the sort of “mental world” that produced the physical world.” It just can’t demonstrate any of that. This is where theism falls apart completely because it has nothing that can be identified as justifiable true belief. It has claims, nothing more. Claims are not enough. If this article was trying to rip apart theism, it did a poor job. In fact, it’s doing a pretty poor job at just about everything.
Really, I’m just not seeing much use in it. Maybe next time, when they get to the decisive evidence argument, it might improve but I’m not going to hold my breath. I spent most of this entry just skipping ahead because I was getting tired of my eyes rolling into the back of my head.
Come on, it can’t be that hard, can it?