Next, we move on to part two of this article on moral realism, provided on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website. This one is on metaphysics and I hope it isn’t as defensive as the last one. Will they provide any actual evidence for their position? I don’t know.

Let’s go find out.

“Putting aside the arguments that appeal to moral disagreement, a significant motivation for anti-realism about morality is found in worries about the metaphysics of moral realism and especially worries about whether moral realism might be reconciled with (what has come to be called) naturalism.” Nope, they’re still talking about anti-realism. I had to check the top of the page to make sure I was in the right place. This is, indeed, the page on moral realism, yet they haven’t really talked about it except in terms of the people who disagree. I’m not sure how that gets them anywhere.

Now I’ll be really honest, I’m not remotely interested in metaphysics which can’t be tied back to the real world. It is, once again, a big reason why I’m a moral anti-realist, because the realist position doesn’t seem based in anything identifiable as reality. Like so many other things, it seems to be hunting emotional comfort instead of dealing with objective truth.

“According to naturalism, the only facts we should believe in are those countenanced by, or at least compatible with, the results of science. To find, of some putative fact, that its existence is neither established by, nor even compatible with science, is to discover, as naturalism would have it, that there is no such fact. If moral realism requires facts that are incompatible with science (as many think it does) that alone would constitute a formidable argument against it.” No, that’s absolutely not the case. We accept naturalism because that’s all we have any evidence for. We’ve never seen anything non-natural, that is, that didn’t come from the natural world. This, again, is something we see in religion all the time, the assumption that naturalism is some kind of quasi-religious, faith-based position, arrived at, not through consistent observation but through blind belief. That is just nonsense and it continues to show just how religious the ideas behind moral realism seem to be.

“Moral realists, in contrast, are standardly seen as unable to sustain their accounts without appealing, in the end, to putative facts that fly in the face of naturalism.” No, that fly in the face of reality. My biggest complaint about moral realism is that they can point to no conceivable observation in the real world that might support their claims. This is right where I think so many philosophers lose the thread. They are so busy noodling their navels that they lose any demonstrable connection to the real world. If your ideas aren’t remotely applicable to the world in which we live, then your ideas are crap! Knock it off!

It then goes into a discussion on goodness and what it means, which I hold that you can’t objectively have. There is no such thing as objective “good,” any more than there is an objective “evil”. It’s all purely subjective in the human mind. It is because  objective good and evil are not demonstrable in reality that moral realism makes absolutely no rational sense. It ignores the real world in favor of an emotionally comforting position, just like religion does. It isn’t about what is demonstrably true, it’s about what makes them happy, which is the same criticism that I level against religion. Your happiness doesn’t impact the real world. Stop embarrassing yourself!

“Now of course moral realists can consistently acknowledge this and then argue against naturalism—perhaps, at least in part, on the grounds that naturalism is incompatible with acknowledging moral facts.” Except it doesn’t work that way! This is like the religious saying they can argue against science, on the grounds that science disagrees with their holy revealed truth! You know, that truth they can’t actually demonstrate that they have. This is purely fallacious, it’s starting with an emotionally-comforting conclusion, backed up by absolutely nothing else, and demanding they’re right, just because they want to be right. Never once, so far at least, in this article have they ever just tried to rationally justify moral realism. They just assume it’s true and that’s not how this works!

Then we get into a long discussion on Moore’s Open Question, which is really such a waste of time because it doesn’t actually support their side. This is philosophers baldly rationalizing their way around the problems to get back to the emotionally-comforting conclusion that they wanted to reach all along! Where is the positive evidence that there is a mind-independent moral reality, beyond the fact that they really wish that there was? There is absolutely no difference between this and religion. None at all and that’s not something to be proud of.

“Once the Open Question is sidelined as being, at least, not decisive, room is left for thinking a correct account of the moral facts might identify them as natural facts. Just which facts those might be, and what arguments one might offer for one account rather than another, remains open, but the idea that we can know ahead of time that there are no good arguments for such an account is no longer widely accepted.” Once they arbitrarily dispose of yet another criticism of their side, they reach the conclusion that maybe, just maybe, they might be able to shove moral realism in there somewhere. Now we’re up to philosophy-of-the-gaps. They can’t actually demonstrate that it’s true, but maybe if they try really hard, they can shove it in there somehow while actual rational thinkers chip away at it around the edges, because it really makes these people feel good to think that there is a moral reality when, every shred of evidence that we have shows otherwise.

This whole thing is just ridiculous. Never once have they tried to defend their own views, they just respond to their critics, never in any kind of intellectual way, they just try to explain away all of their attackers, based on fee-fees. It’s a lot of “they say this but we don’t like it!” I don’t care what you like! I care what you can demonstrate to be factually correct!

I went into this thinking they’d actually be able to make a strong case but they can’t. I suppose it’s no longer  a surprise that I’ve yet to see a single defensible case made for moral realism. It’s a purely emotional position to hold. It has absolutely no evidence whatsoever. It’s another case of “my fee-fees matter more to me than the facts”. Sorry, but that’s childish. I expect it from the religious, who do the exact same thing, but from one of the biggest online sources of philosophical information? I expect a lot better than that.

Maybe it will improve in part 3, I don’t know. Come on back in a couple of days and we’ll see how this goes. I wouldn’t be holding my breath that they’ll get anywhere useful.