I was thinking about this over the last couple of days, but maybe you can relate to this. Have you ever watched two theists debate? It doesn’t matter what kind of theist they are, they can share the same faith or they can be completely different, but it’s really not very impressive if you approach it from the outside.
Why is that? Here’s my explanation and why I think playing those games is ultimately pointless. Continue reading It’s Hard to be Impressed
Fair warning, this part is going to be long because it’s an extended look at “local atheism” and that will take up the next three parts of this look at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s article on atheism and agnosticism.
So let’s get to it. This time, I’ll look at the introduction and first part. Continue reading Let’s Look at Philosophical Atheism Part 6a
After really finding nothing impressive in the argument for agnosticism, it’s time to turn our gaze to global atheism and I can already tell you that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy won’t be doing well here. Of course, the kind of people who would take any of this seriously, they won’t care what I have to say, will they?
Granted, that’s just more evidence that a lot of people operate as if they were religious. “You don’t take the Bible seriously because you lack faith!” No, I don’t take it seriously because there’s no evidence that it’s true. The same seems to be the case for these entries in the SEP.
Let’s take a look anyhow. See you below. Continue reading Let’s Look at Philosophical Atheism Part 5
Three parts down, on to the fourth. This time, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on atheism and agnosticism tries to make an argument for agnosticism. Is it going to be any more impressive than the last couple? I wouldn’t be holding my breath. So far, this has all been “we like this definition” and it’s never been about what the words actually mean, because they aren’t actually handling language the way it at it realistically functions.
However, we’ll see where this goes and evaluate it as it comes. See you on the other side. Continue reading Let’s Look at Philosophical Atheism Part 4
Just fair warning, but because this is going to be a very long series, I’m going to try to break it up instead of just going straight through. Therefore, you can expect to see one or two parts per week, with at least one intermission, just so nobody gets bored.
Therefore, let’s take a look at part three of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on atheism and agnosticism. This one is titled “Global Atheism Versus Local Atheisms” and that might be interesting to see. So… let’s get started. Continue reading Let’s Look at Philosophical Atheism Part 3
Today, we’re back with part 2 of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosopy’s entry on atheism and agnosticism. I will admit that, so far at least, it has been better than the entry on moral realism. At least the author differentiates the usage as one that is useful within philosophical discussions, something that I wish a lot more armchair philosophers would figure out. Mostly, they insist that everyone uses the SEP definition when discussing the subject outside of philosophical circles.
Yeah, that’s not going to go well for you. Continue reading Let’s Look at Philosophical Atheism Part 2
This was recommended by Randolf Richardson over on YouTube during the recent moral realism pooch screw and I thought it would be a fine topic to take on here. Therefore, we’re going to return to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to check out their entry on atheism and agnosticism.
I’d say this ought to be fun but it won’t be. Continue reading Let’s Look at Philosophical Atheism
Let’s knock this out with a bang. This time we’re going to look at the section regarding “Semantics” on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for moral realism. I can’t say that I have high hopes that they’ll manage to turn it all around, but I’m willing to give them the chance.
So, will they ever actually try to defend moral realism or will they just continue to whine about how mean the moral anti-realists are? Let’s find out. Continue reading Evaluating Moral Realism Part 5
Part 4 brings us to the section in the article on moral realism on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy labeled “Epistemology”. Hopefully this is better than what we’ve seen so far but I’m not going to be holding my breath.
So let’s jump right into it, shall we? Continue reading Evaluating Moral Realism Part 4
Today, we get on to part 3 of the entry on moral realism, found on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy site and I very much hope that they can do better this time out than they have in the past.
The problem, for those who have been reading along, is that the entire “argument” for moral realism has been pointing out all of its detractors and then whining about it because it doesn’t make advocates happy.
Screw your happiness! Produce evidence that you’re right! So here we go again. I don’t know that it can get any worse. Continue reading Evaluating Moral Realism Part 3