I’ve mentioned this a couple of times, but people who are stuck in their current mindset really have problems. I ran across this video from Atheist Experience and, just the very beginning of the call, spells out exactly why the whole thing is so dumb.
So let’s look at it.
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This is incredible common, but here’s yet another example from The Atheist Experience where the hosts just don’t understand what the hell they’re doing wrong. It isn’t just Matt that used to pull this stuff, it’s a lot of them because I think there are people of a particular political persuasion who just can’t figure it out.
So let’s explore it. Continue reading They Can’t See What They’re Doing Wrong
Let’s knock this out with a bang. This time we’re going to look at the section regarding “Semantics” on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for moral realism. I can’t say that I have high hopes that they’ll manage to turn it all around, but I’m willing to give them the chance.
So, will they ever actually try to defend moral realism or will they just continue to whine about how mean the moral anti-realists are? Let’s find out. Continue reading Evaluating Moral Realism Part 5
Part 4 brings us to the section in the article on moral realism on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy labeled “Epistemology”. Hopefully this is better than what we’ve seen so far but I’m not going to be holding my breath.
So let’s jump right into it, shall we? Continue reading Evaluating Moral Realism Part 4
Today, we get on to part 3 of the entry on moral realism, found on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy site and I very much hope that they can do better this time out than they have in the past.
The problem, for those who have been reading along, is that the entire “argument” for moral realism has been pointing out all of its detractors and then whining about it because it doesn’t make advocates happy.
Screw your happiness! Produce evidence that you’re right! So here we go again. I don’t know that it can get any worse. Continue reading Evaluating Moral Realism Part 3
Next, we move on to part two of this article on moral realism, provided on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website. This one is on metaphysics and I hope it isn’t as defensive as the last one. Will they provide any actual evidence for their position? I don’t know.
Let’s go find out. Continue reading Evaluating Moral Realism Part 2
Today, we’re going to take a look at section 1 of the article on Moral Realism, posted over at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. This time out, we’re evaluating a section that they call “Moral Disagreement.” Will it make any sense? Only time will tell.
Get comfortable and we’ll dive right in. Continue reading Evaluating Moral Realism Part 1
I’ve been doing a lot of reading on moral realism of late, for obvious reasons, and I’m still not remotely convinced that it holds any water. Therefore, I wanted to grab something from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and at least start to talk about the article in passing. It just doesn’t demonstrate anything objectively real.
This time, we’ll just go over the introduction, otherwise this is going to be a very, very long post. I’ll come back and look at the rest as time allows, working one section at a time. Continue reading Evaluating Moral Realism Part 0
I was listening to a couple of videos and the idea of morality came up. To their credit, they admitted that morality is entirely subjective, but they said that, if you start off with the idea that well-being is your goal, then you can make objective decisions from that point forward.
Except that’s absolutely not true. Continue reading Well-being Isn’t Enough