I watched a couple of videos lately on old TV shows and cartoons from the 30s and 40s mostly, and how some episodes are not readily available today because they offend people’s fee-fees. I find that absurd and pathetic, but I find most people these days, especially young people, to be absurd and pathetic.
Today, we’re back with part 2 of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosopy’s entry on atheism and agnosticism. I will admit that, so far at least, it has been better than the entry on moral realism. At least the author differentiates the usage as one that is useful within philosophical discussions, something that I wish a lot more armchair philosophers would figure out. Mostly, they insist that everyone uses the SEP definition when discussing the subject outside of philosophical circles.
This was recommended by Randolf Richardson over on YouTube during the recent moral realism pooch screw and I thought it would be a fine topic to take on here. Therefore, we’re going to return to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to check out their entry on atheism and agnosticism.
Let’s say something that a lot of people just don’t like. You are a ball of meat. You owe your very existence to a 3-pound lump of flesh in your head. Your body is just a life support system for the meat sack that makes you who you are. If that meat gets damaged or dies, so do you.
Welcome to reality. Yet the fact remains that a lot of people get really upset when you point this very simple fact out. Why is that? Continue reading You are a Ball of Meat→
I came across this on a philosophy discussion board, where someone asked for evidence, any evidence at all, for moral realism and I think it’s very telling that there was none.
Let’s knock this out with a bang. This time we’re going to look at the section regarding “Semantics” on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for moral realism. I can’t say that I have high hopes that they’ll manage to turn it all around, but I’m willing to give them the chance.
So, will they ever actually try to defend moral realism or will they just continue to whine about how mean the moral anti-realists are? Let’s find out. Continue reading Evaluating Moral Realism Part 5→
Part 4 brings us to the section in the article on moral realism on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy labeled “Epistemology”. Hopefully this is better than what we’ve seen so far but I’m not going to be holding my breath.
Today, we get on to part 3 of the entry on moral realism, found on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy site and I very much hope that they can do better this time out than they have in the past.
The problem, for those who have been reading along, is that the entire “argument” for moral realism has been pointing out all of its detractors and then whining about it because it doesn’t make advocates happy.
Next, we move on to part two of this article on moral realism, provided on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website. This one is on metaphysics and I hope it isn’t as defensive as the last one. Will they provide any actual evidence for their position? I don’t know.
Today, we’re going to take a look at section 1 of the article on Moral Realism, posted over at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. This time out, we’re evaluating a section that they call “Moral Disagreement.” Will it make any sense? Only time will tell.